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The Genomic Research and Accessibility Act:
More Science Fiction than Fact
By James DeGiulio *
I. OVERVIEW
¶1

This article discusses the recently proposed Genomic Research and Accessibility
Act (GRAA), the creation of California Representative Xavier Becerra. If enacted, this
legislation will remove DNA from patentable subject matter in a broad stroke. Part one
of this article will introduce the gene patent issue and how it has regained the attention of
Congress. Part two will present an introduction on the science of DNA, gene
patentability and a brief background of the important events leading to the current status
of DNA patents. Part three will introduce the language of the GRAA and analyze the
reasons why certain scientific groups and members of Congress are convinced DNA must
be removed from patentable subject matter. This article will focus on the arguments put
forth at a subsequent Congressional hearing on the issue of DNA patentability. Finally,
part four will conclude the article by discussing the fate of the GRAA, as predicted by the
author.
II. INTRODUCTION

¶2

¶3

The first gene patent was granted in 1982 to the Regents of the University of
California for construction of a plasmid contained in a bacterium and expression of a
gene for a hormone that promotes maternal breast development during pregnancy. 1 Often
the topic of controversy, gene patents have recently become the subject of heightened
media attention thanks to author and medical doctor Michael Crichton’s 2006 book
“Next.” While researching for his novel, Crichton arrived at some strong opinions on the
subject of gene patents and subsequently published them in a recent New York Times
column. 2
Crichton’s article opens by striking fear into the hearts of the public: “You, or
someone you love, may die because of a gene patent that should never have been granted
in the first place.” 3 While certainly an effective strategy in fictional storytelling,
Crichton’s alarmist assertions about gene patents have minimal scientific facts to support
them. After taking his readers through a few of the oft-cited examples of gene patenting

* Northwestern University School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2010; Ph.D., Northwestern University, 2007.
1
Gene Patents and Global Competition Issues, 26 GENETIC ENGINEERING & BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWS,
Jan. 1, 2006, available at http://www.genengnews.com/articles/chitem.aspx?aid=1163&chid=0.
2
Michael Crichton, Patenting Life, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2007, at A23, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/13/opinion/13crichton.html.
3
Id.
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gone wrong (many of which are discussed later in the article), Crichton concludes with an
endorsement for Representative Xavier Becerra’s GRAA (H.R. 977). 4
This comment analyzes the research that is presented in support of the GRAA and
the arguments for and against gene patenting. Congress, and society, must decide if such
legislation is merely reactive to an outcry of science fiction panic, or is necessary reform
based on actual evidence and the needs of public policy.
III. BACKGROUND ON DNA PATENTS

¶5

In order to understand the nature of gene patents, some background on patent law
and DNA as patentable subject matter is appropriate. We begin with a brief primer on the
science of DNA. This primer is admittedly oversimplified, as the biology of DNA is quite
complex. Then we introduce a timeline of the more important events leading to the
current status of DNA patents and outline the patentability requirements in the United
States and its treatment of DNA to this point.
A. Primer on DNA and Genetics

¶6

¶7

¶8

DNA is a complex chemical made up of a sequence of nucleotides, each of which
contains one of the four bases: adenine, cytosine, guanine and thymine. One of the
primary functions of DNA is serving as the source of the information necessary to
produce proteins, which in turn provide the functions of a living organism. Humans have
around three billion of these nucleotides, arranged in a precise order in our chromosomes.
A common definition of “gene” is a full-length DNA sequence that encodes a
complete protein. Accordingly, the term “gene patent” in this article will refer to a patent
that claims at least a DNA sequence that encodes a complete protein or portion thereof.
However, as will become clear later, arriving at a precise and accurate definition of “gene
patent” is part of the controversy.
There are various incentives for understanding how DNA processing works.
Identification of the function of genes has the potential to provide great therapeutic
benefit. In humans, the primary focus is health care, which includes identifying and
testing for genetic diseases, producing synthetic therapeutic proteins to replace defective
natural proteins, producing other small molecule drugs that interact with particular
proteins, and developing therapies to rectify or replace defective genes. 5
B. DNA Patentability Timeline

¶9

The double-helix structure of DNA was first discovered by Watson and Crick.
Interestingly, they refused to patent this structure - a decision that advocates of removing
DNA from patentable subject matter are quick to exploit. 6 Since its discovery, DNA has
received differing forms of treatment by patent law. However, there are several
prominent cases and legislation that define the current state of DNA patents.

4

Id.
Dianne Nicol, On the Legality of Gene Patents, 29 MELB. U. L. REV. 809, 812 (2005).
6
Melissa L. Sturges, Comment, Who Should Hold Property Rights to the Human Genome? An
Application of the Common Heritage of Humankind, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 219, 243 n.128 (1997).
5
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¶10

Arguably, the most important event in the development of gene patents was the
decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, where the Supreme Court held that recombinant
microorganisms are patentable, which opened the door for patents on living things. 7 The
Supreme Court held that living organisms fall within the realm of patentable subject
matter as long as they are “a nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of
matter – a product of human ingenuity.” 8
¶11
The Federal Circuit confirmed DNA satisfied the Chakrabarty test in Amgen, Inc.
v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., holding that “purified and isolated” gene sequences are
different from those occurring in nature. 9 Amgen’s inventor did not have the “mental
picture” of the erythropoietin gene until the gene had been isolated. Importantly, the
Federal Circuit understood and confirmed that DNA is a chemical, stating that “[a] gene
is a chemical compound, albeit a complex one.” 10
¶12
In 1980, Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act, 11 which encouraged universities to
patent and commercialize inventions derived from government research grants. 12 The
Bayh-Dole Act further provided for the efficient transfer of patents on inventions arising
from federally-funded research into the private sector, and granted university professors
the right to file for patents on federally funded discoveries. Accompanying the enactment
of Bayh-Dole, and in the years subsequent to its passage, federal financial commitments
dedicated to biomedical research dramatically increased. As a consequence of these
governmental actions, the number of patents assigned to universities increased from 264
in 1979 to 3,259 in 2003. 13
¶13
These events led to the 1990 founding of the Human Genome Project, the goal of
which was to code three billion nucleotides contained in the human genome and to
identify all the genes present in it. The Project’s efforts have led to the discovery of
approximately 35,000 genes. The mid-1990s was a period of growth in DNA-related
patents in the United States, at a rate of 50 percent per year. 14 Today, the biotechnology
sector in the United States has reached gargantuan proportions, expanding from $8 billion
in 1992 to $50.7 billion in 2005. 15

7

447 U.S. 303 (1980).
Id. at 309.
9
927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
10
Id. at 1206.
11
35 U.S.C. §§ 200-12 (2000).
12
See generally Roger D. Klein, Gene Patents and Genetic Testing in the United States, 25 NATURE 989
(2007).
13
Roger Klein, Gene Patents Jeopardize Genetic Testing, 27 GENETIC ENGINEERING &
BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWS, May 1, 2007, available at
http://www.genengnews.com/articles/chitem.aspx?aid=2092&chid=0.
14
Timothy Caulfield et al., Evidence and Anecdotes: An Analysis of Human Gene Patenting
Controversies, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1091 (2006).
15
Stifling or Stimulating – The Role of Gene Patents in Research and Genetic Testing: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. 61 (2007) [hereinafter Gene Patent Hearings] (statement of Jeffrey P. Kushan, Biotechnology
Industry Organization).
8
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C. Stricter Standards for Patentability
¶14

¶15

¶16

¶17

¶18

To decide whether the GRAA has merit, it is essential to have a base understanding
of patent standards and how they have been applied to DNA. The United States Patent
and Trademark Office will approve a patent on an invention if it satisfies the statutory
requirements of being “useful, novel, and non-obvious.” 16 Generally, the standards for
patenting inventions have become stricter due to the evolving jurisprudence in the
doctrines of inherent anticipation and obviousness.
For a gene to be patentable, it must be useful. 17 Typically the utility standard has
been easily met; however, in 2001, the PTO issued guidelines that demanded applicants
identify a specific, substantial and credible utility for their inventions. 18 The guidelines
require the disclosure to have a scientifically credible basis of support. The heightened
utility requirements of the PTO guidelines were supported by the Federal Circuit in 2005
in In re Fisher, which held that the mere potential for use in discovering a gene was not
sufficient to satisfy the specific and substantial utility requirements of § 101. 19
To receive patent protection, the invention must be novel. Under 35 U.S.C. § 102,
this equates to not being anticipated by the prior art. An invention is anticipated if a prior
art reference expressly or inherently discloses each and every limitation of the claimed
invention. 20 The evolution of inherent anticipation may make it more difficult for the
applicant to obtain gene patents. The doctrine of inherent anticipation may preclude an
applicant from claiming certain fragments of a gene if that gene is disclosed by prior art.
To receive patent protection, an invention must also be nonobvious at the time of
the invention to one of ordinary skill in the relevant art under 35 U.S.C. § 103. In KSR
International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., the Supreme Court disapproved of the manner in which
the Federal Circuit applied the accepted teaching, suggestion, or motivation (TSM) test
and suggested a less rigid application. 21 The Court emphasized looking at secondary
considerations, but did not provide a clear standard. 22 This relaxing of the obviousness
standard may make it more difficult to obtain gene patents. A recent example is In re
Kubin, 23 where the Federal Circuit found that a DNA sequence was not patentable
because, under KSR’s obvious-to-try standard, the prior art’s disclosure of the NAIL
protein and antibody for NAIL rendered the DNA sequence of the gene obvious.
The Patent and Trademark Office along with the decisions in the Federal Circuit
and Supreme Court have raised the bar for obtaining patents on DNA. Thus, obtaining
patents over DNA is more difficult than it has have ever been. Despite the adjustments to
the patentability standards of DNA, some legislators believe that a more dramatic change
is needed to address the issue. As a result, there has been a recent push for legislative
action barring DNA from patentable subject matter altogether, which is the goal of the
GRAA.

16

See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-13 (2000).
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
18
Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001).
19
421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
20
See Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1576-78 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
21
550 U.S. 398 (2007).
22
Id.
23
561 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
17
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IV. THE GENOMIC RESEARCH AND ACCESSIBILITY ACT
¶19

On February 7, 2007, Congressmen Xavier Becerra, a Democrat of California, and
Dave Weldon, a Republican of Florida, introduced the GRAA to the House of
Representatives.
Representative Becerra’s introductory statement illustrates the
motivation for the bill, which seeks to “end the practice of gene patenting” by giving
“guidance to the [PTO] on what is not patentable – in this case, genetic material,
naturally-occurring or modified.” 24 In Becerra’s view, this bill will “correct the
regulatory mistake” that allows genes to be patented. 25
¶20
The language of the GRAA is extremely broad, reading, “Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, no patent may be obtained for a nucleotide sequence, or its
functions or correlations, or the naturally occurring products it specifies.” 26 Though the
purpose of the bill is to remove DNA from patentable subject matter, the bill is not
limited to banning patents on DNA. As the text reads, the statute promulgates a ban on
patenting “the naturally occurring products [a nucleic acid] specifies.” 27
¶21
Read literally, the GRAA would ban patenting of all naturally-occurring proteins
produced by any means, including many critical therapeutic proteins such as hemoglobin,
erythropoietin, albumen, and human growth hormone. It would also ban any diagnostic
assay that depended on detection of genetic polymorphisms, which are the genetic basis
for many important diseases. Dr. Kevin Noonan, a Chicago patent attorney, astutely
notes: “In short, the bill would eliminate patent production for the molecules that are
expected to provide the pipeline of new drugs for the next twenty years.” 28 Indeed, any
trained scientist should realize that the language is so overbroad that it has the potential to
cripple the biotechnology industry. Intellectual Property Today columnist Steven
Ludwig commented that “[w]hen I first read the scope of the exclusion, I thought I must
have read it wrong.” 29
¶22
On March 1, 2007, the bill was referred to the Subcommittee on Courts, the
Internet and Intellectual Property. Though not explicitly in response to the GRAA, on
October 30, 2007 Representative Howard L. Berman held a hearing, entitled “Stifling or
Stimulating: The Role of Gene Patents in Research and Genetic Testing.” 30 In his
introduction, Representative Berman introduced the controversy over DNA patents and
some of the arguments for and against them before turning the floor over to four
individuals who presented testimony. 31 The testimony given at this hearing provided a
framework to analyze the merits of the GRAA. The GRAA can be contextualized by
analyzing the arguments and supporting research on both sides of the gene patent
controversy.

24

153 CONG. REC. E315-16 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2007) (statement of Rep. Becerra).
Id.
26
H.R. 977, 110th Cong. § 2 (1st Sess. 2007).
27
Id.
28
Posting of Kevin E. Noonan to Patent Docs, The Continuing Threat to Human Gene Patenting,
http://www.patentdocs.org/2007/10/the-continuing-.html?cid=86709402 (Oct. 16, 2007, 23:52 CST).
29
Steven R. Ludwig, Attacking Gene Patents: Interesting Conversation – Bad Policy, INTELL. PROP.
TODAY, Jan. 2008, at 8.
30
Gene Patent Hearings, supra note 15.
31
See Gene Patent Hearings, supra note 15, at 1-3 (statement of Rep. Howard L. Berman, Chairman of
the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property).
25
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V. THE ISSUES WITH GENE PATENTING
¶23

Four members of the biotechnology research community gave testimony at the
hearing: Marc Grodman, CEO of Bio-Reference Laboratories; Jon Soderstrom, managing
director of the Office of Cooperative Research at Yale University and President-Elect for
the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM); Lawrence Sung, a
professor at the University of Maryland and partner at Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP; and
Jeffrey Kushan, who presented testimony on behalf of the Biotechnology Industry
Organization. Each member discussed various arguments regarding DNA patent reform.
Though each member endorsed some type of gene patent reform, none presented
testimony in favor of the sweeping reform embodied in the GRAA.
A. Patenting Life?

¶24

Representative Becerra’s statement introducing the GRAA claims that “one-fifth of
the blueprint that makes you . . . me . . . our children . . . all of us . . . who we are is
owned by someone else. And we have absolutely no say in what those patent holders do
with our genes.” 32 This argument has been the media darling and most inflammatory
argument against gene patenting—that someone else can own your genes. Indeed,
Michael Crichton, as a strong supporter of the GRAA, chastises the current system that
disallows donations of patented genes to a scientist of one’s choosing. He blasts this
disconnect, claiming “[the] gene may exist in your body, but it’s now private property.” 33
Further, web sites such as www.whoownsyourbody.org spark public anxiety over the idea
that corporations own parts of their bodies through gene patents. As Crichton has shown,
this is great material for best-selling science fiction novels, but the question is whether it
has any actual scientific or legal merit.
¶25
This argument is known as the “universal heritage” argument, and its basic premise
is that the human genome is part of every person, so it should belong to all humanity.
The emphasis is placed on preserving the territory for future generations rather than
focusing on current economic interests. 34 Universal heritage theorists argue that genes
are the product of millions of years of evolution and are thus the property of all mankind,
not any one individual. 35
¶26
In support of the universal heritage argument, the Canavan disease case is
frequently presented. Indeed, it is introduced by Becerra and Crichton, and is cited often
by writers who oppose gene patents. 36 In that case, a family afflicted by a rare genetic
disorder initiated an effort to find the gene mutation for the disease. They raised money,
collected DNA samples, and recruited genetic researchers to investigate the disease.
They were successful, and the gene was identified in the late 1990s. The researcher and
his employer, Miami Children’s Hospital, obtained a patent on the gene and began
charging royalties on a genetic test to screen for the disease. Patient groups filed suit in
2000, contending misappropriation of trade secrets by using their children’s DNA
32

See 153 CONG. REC. E316 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2007).
See Crichton, supra note 2.
34
See Sturges, supra note 6, at 248.
35
See Mark A. Chavez, Gene Patenting: Do The Ends Justify the Means?, 7 COMPUTER L. REV. &
TECH. J. 255, 264 (2003).
36
See Crichton, supra note 2.
33
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without consent to obtain a patent. In 2003, a confidential settlement was reached
allowing certain laboratories to continue collecting royalties but allowing institutions,
doctors, and scientists free use of the patented sequences. Opponents of gene patents
argue that researchers never would have found the gene without the efforts and the DNA
samples of the afflicted. 37
¶27
Jeffrey Kushan addressed this sensitive issue during the hearing. First, he noted the
important distinction that patents are not granted on genes or sequences, but novel
chemical molecules. Consequently, the term “gene patents” is a misnomer. 38 Following
Chakrabarty and Amgen, genes as they exist in nature cannot be patented. 39 Only after
conducting research and establishing the utility of nucleic acids can they be patented.
Under the PTO Guidelines 40 and In re Fisher, 41 the function or role of a gene must be
elucidated before a practical application can be derived from the DNA comprising the
gene. The utility threshold of DNA can only be met upon the finding of a practical
application, such as enabling commercial production of a desired protein the DNA
encodes, or providing the basis of a clinical diagnostic tool. 42
¶28
Kushan’s argument illustrates that technically any person’s DNA is outside of
patent claims. Since DNA must be isolated from the genome to qualify for patentability,
it is impossible for any corporation or university holding a patent on a gene to own any
person’s DNA. However, Representative Becerra dismisses the Federal Circuit holding
in Amgen that patent claims to nucleic acids require that they are “isolated” or “purified
and isolated” 43 as “mere wordplay”. 44 Wordplay or not, it is clear that no company owns
anyone’s particular genes. Companies own a patent on isolated DNA sequences with a
practical application.
B.

Effect of Gene Patents on Innovation

¶29

The rallying cry of opponents of gene patents is that they stifle innovation. Indeed,
Becerra invokes this argument in support of the GRAA, stating “[r]esearch into disease
cures is impeded when the holder of a patent on the disease gene prohibits other scientists
from undertaking research involving that gene. Patent holders have shut down genetic
disease research projects at major universities.” 45 This argument represents the most
dominant policy concern against gene patenting.
¶30
At the outset of the hearing on gene patenting, Representative Howard Berman
cited the examination of gene patents’ role in stimulating or stifling research as the
central purpose of the hearing. 46 Berman mentioned that there is anecdotal information
37

Denise Caruso, Someone (Other Than You) May Own Your Genes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2007, at 3.3.
See Kushan, supra note 15, at 64.
39
See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) and Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d
1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991) for a discussion.
40
See Utility Examination Guidelines, supra note 18.
41
421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
42
See Gene Patent Hearings, supra note 15, at 65 (statement of Jeffrey P. Kushan, Biotechnology
Industry Organization) (discussing In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
43
See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
44
See Becerra, supra note 24, at E316.
45
Xavier Becerra, Talking Points, http://becerra.house.gov/HoR/CA31/Issues/genepatents.htm (last
visited Feb. 20, 2008).
46
See Gene Patent Hearings, supra note 15, at 2.
38
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that suggests researchers have discontinued research because of the threat of lawsuit by
patent holders, but then acknowledges that there is data suggesting just the opposite. 47
The two sides of this argument are well addressed by the various testimonies at the
hearing, and we will examine the available evidence to determine which side is best
supported by the data.
1. Effect of Gene Patents on Research
¶31

¶32

¶33

¶34

¶35

In an oft-cited article published in the highly influential journal Science, Michael
Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg hypothesized that patents upstream of final products could
create an “anticommons” effect, encumbering research progress and access to resources,
thus making it difficult to acquire sufficient intellectual property and stifling innovation. 48
They predicted that permitting gene patenting would restrict progress, inhibit academic
freedom, and prevent scientists from working cooperatively. Although no empirical
evidence was cited, the idea quickly gained a good deal of attention.
E. Jonathan Soderstrom addressed the anticommons hypothesis as it relates to gene
patents. Soderstrom pointed to several studies (discussed independently throughout this
article) which show that “the licensing of DNA patents at US academic institutions has
not led to the decline in academic cooperation and technology transfer that many
observers have feared.” 49
At the hearing, Jeffrey P. Kushan expanded on Soderstrom’s points against gene
patents’ role in stifling innovation. Kushan included an article written by Ted Buckley,
the BIO director of Economic Policy, which contains some interesting empirical
evidentiary findings that refute the “anticommons” effect feared by gene patent
opposition. 50
Buckley suggested that if the anticommons were occurring, we would expect the
amount of research and development to decline. However, since 1998, research and
development of publicly traded biotech companies has increased over 60%, and between
1995 and 2005 the amount of venture capital funding for biotechnology companies has
increased 300%. 51 Employment in the biotechnology sector has increased 21% since
1998. 52 Thus, instead of seeing what one would expect from an industry experiencing an
anticommons effect, one observes an industry that is increasing research and
development levels, as well as increasing employment.
If the anticommons were occurring, research would be increasingly difficult, and
the number of innovative therapies would be expected to decrease. Buckley observed
that the number of biological compounds entering preclinical trials in 2005 was 37%

47

Id.
Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in
Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998).
49
See Gene Patent Hearings, supra note 15, at 27 (statement of E. Jonathan Soderstrom, J.D., Ph.D.,
Managing Director, Office of Cooperative Research).
50
Ted Buckley, The Myth of the Anticommons (May 31, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Biotechnology Industrial Organization), available at
www.bio.org/ip/domestic/TheMythoftheAnticommons.pdf.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 3.
48
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higher than in 1998, 53 cutting against the anticommons theory that gene patents are
stifling research.
¶36
Other studies have revealed that minimal research-blocking effects of patents have
been found. The National Academy of Sciences surveyed 414 academic researchers from
universities, non-profits, and government labs to examine how patents have impacted
their research. 54 Interestingly, only 5% of these researchers regularly check for patents
on knowledge inputs related to their research. 55 Only 1% of academic respondents stated
that they had experienced delays on their projects due to patents on knowledge inputs. 56
Even in areas of patent-intensive research where issues of access to intellectual property
should be evident, only 3% of respondents reported stopping a project in the past two
years because of a patent. 57 The report concluded that there is “[n]o evidence that
widespread assertion of patent rights on genes has significantly hampered biomedical
research.” 58
¶37
Advocates of reform are convinced that the rate of DNA patent infringement
litigation is rising, providing another stifling cost to innovation. This perception is
derived from three reports warning of the consequences of industry stifling innovation. 59
Further, Madey v. Duke University 60 opened the door for infringement assertions against
universities and other public research institutions. Since universities and public research
institutions are generally less well funded than the private sector, the hefty cost of
litigation is thought to hamper innovation at these crucial centers for biomedical research.
¶38
Professor Lawrence M. Sung addressed this issue at the hearing. He is an advocate
for change in gene patenting, yet his proposal falls short of the scope of the GRAA. In
response to the Madey fears, Sung proposed that the statutory clinical trial exemption in
the patent infringement statute section 61 should be expanded to include an exemption for
research use. 62 This proposal would immunize academic researchers and their
institutions from patent infringement and establish a right to use patented technology for
basic research without fear of litigation. 63 Sung conceded that legislation may be needed
in order to restore the balance between the interests of commercial exclusivity and public
access to genetic technology. However, perhaps in a thinly veiled response to the
GRAA, he warned, “the potential for unintended consequences in any change to patent

53

Id.
John P. Walsh et al., View from the Bench: Patents and Material Transfers, 309 SCIENCE 2002, 200203 (2005).
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
See id.
58
See Gene Patent Hearings, supra note 15, at 27 (statement of E. Jonathan Soderstrom, J.D., Ph.D,
Managing Director, Office of Cooperative Research).
59
See Ann E. Mills & Patti Tereskerz, DNA-based Patents: An Empirical Analysis, 26 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 993, 993, 995 nn.7-9 (2008) (concluding that “[t]he perception of rising rates of litigation
derives from three reports warning of dire consequences if industry is unable to innovate and successfully
commercialize new products” and citing those three reports).
60
307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
61
35 U.S.C. § 273 (2000).
62
See Gene Patent Hearings, supra note 15, at 7 (statement of Lawrence M. Sung, Ph.D).
63
Id. at 13.
54
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laws, which may have disparate impact upon various technologies and industries,
strongly suggests that such action should be approached with careful deliberation.” 64
¶39
In 2008, Ann Mills and Patricia Tereskerz conducted a study to determine whether
or not the rates of DNA-based patent litigation are actually rising. 65 They analyzed 211
cases involving DNA-based patents issued between 1982 and 2005, finding that in 163 of
these 211 cases (77%), a complaint was filed with no further action being taken. 66 The
authors suggested that the results “should call into question whether the perception of
rising litigation rates is valid for some industries and whether this argument can continue
to be used to justify patent reform without additional research.” 67 The authors warned
against broad scope legislation, especially “when passage of such legislation may be
accompanied by introducing uncertainty as to patent validity, which may in turn
discourage investment in younger industries and ultimately stifle innovation and
commercialization.” 68 This evidence weakens the argument for the necessity of a radical
legislative response such as the GRAA. Indeed, the authors explicitly warned against
such a response.
¶40
The passage of the GRAA would compromise the status of the United States as
the world leader in biotechnology and pharmaceutical innovation. Patents on genes and
recombinant or transgenic organisms have been vital to America’s preeminence in the
biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries. 69 A recent Washington Post article by
Joseph Fuller and Brock Reeve warns of the complacency of innovation in the United
States. 70 American pharmaceutical companies account for sixty percent of global sales,
and seventy-five percent of biotechnology sales. 71 However, just thirty years ago, half of
the top ten pharmaceutical companies in sales were European, and in the early 1980’s
European companies invented half of the world’s new drugs. 72 Fuller and Reeve credit
the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act and the Diamond v. Chakrabarty decisions as the
source of this change in leadership. 73 In contrast, Europe did not permit patents on living
organisms until 1988, and the European Union did not encourage state-funded
universities to pursue patenting. 74 Fuller and Reeve warn that the restrictions placed on
stem cell research in the United States could lead to falling behind other countries that do
not have such expansive restrictions. 75 It is not a far-fetched assumption that the passage
of the GRAA could have a negative effect on the position of the United States as the
world leader in biotechnology and pharmaceutical innovation.

64

Id. at 14.
Mills & Tereskerz, supra note 59.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
See Posting of Kevin E. Noonan to Patent Docs, The Continuing Value of Biotech Patenting,
http://patentdocs.typepad.com/patent_docs/2007/02/the_continuing_.html (Feb. 4, 2007, 16:24 CST).
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The empirical evidence presented by Soderstrom and Kushan at the hearing refute
the argument that research is stifled by gene patents. The study by Mills further confirms
that the existence of gene patents in specific areas does not deter decisions to choose
research focus in these areas. Though the Madey decision may leave universities
vulnerable to patent infringement suits, the levels of litigation are not rising as feared. A
dramatic response such as the GRAA would cause significant economic harm, including
the risk that the United States falls behind the rest of the world in biomedical
advancement.
2. Effect of Gene Patents on Research Sharing

¶42

The sole argument that Becerra provides data to support is that gene patents have a
negative effect on the sharing of research materials. Becerra relies on a 2003 study that
surveyed 1,077 doctoral students and postdoctoral fellows. 76 He states:
Forty-seven percent of geneticists have been denied requests from other faculty
members for information, data, or materials regarding published research. The
practice of withholding data detrimentally affects the training of the next
generation of scientists. Almost one fourth of doctoral students and postdoctoral
fellows reported they have been denied access to information, data and
materials. 77

¶43

Indeed, a recent study confirms data that shows problems with material transfer
agreements are more prevalent than patents. In this 2005 survey of 414 biomedical
researchers in universities, government, and nonprofit institutions, 19% of the
respondents reported that their most recent request for material was denied. 78 When the
reason for noncompliance was analyzed, the patent status of the requested material had
no significant effect on noncompliance. 79 However, access to materials was more
problematic in patented technologies than the random sample, with thirty percent of
researchers not receiving their last requested materials. 80
¶44
The sharing problem presented by Becerra is perhaps his best-supported argument.
However, this problem is likely to be prevalent to all biotechnology and pharmaceutical
patents, and not specific to DNA patents. Becerra’s lone study compared life science
with computer science and chemical engineering, but the existence of patents was not
discussed. Research endeavors in life science as compared to computer science and
chemical engineering are quite different. It is inappropriate to assume the only difference
between these two disciplines is the ownership of patents.

76
Christine Vogeli et al., Data Withholding and the Next Generation of Scientists: Results of a National
Survey, 81 ACAD. MED. 128 (2006).
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C. Genetic Testing and Public Health
¶45

¶46

¶47

¶48

¶49

Genetic testing involves comparing a patient’s DNA sequence with a reference
sequence. The Human Genome Project has made reference sequences freely available.
Research investments have focused on development of novel test instruments, methods,
and reagents. 81 It is generally well accepted that genetic diagnostics have provided
advancement for overall public health.
Becerra mentioned gene patent effects on genetic testing in his introductory
remarks to Congress, stating: “Gene patents interfere with research on diagnoses and
cures. Half of all laboratories have stopped developing diagnostic tests because of
concerns about infringing gene patents. One laboratory in four has had to abandon a
clinical test in progress because of gene patents.” 82
Becerra relies on a 2006 study that investigated the effect of gene patents on
various stages of research. 83 After finding very little evidence of any limitations on most
research projects, the study turned to gene patents that cover a diagnostic test. In this
case, 25% of labs had abandoned one or more genetic tests as a result of patents. 84 The
patentee sees unlicensed lab testing as competition with his commercial activity. Hence,
it is not surprising that owners are asserting their patent rights. 85
Marc Grodman, CEO of Bio-Reference Laboratories, supports Berreca’s concerns
over gene patent effects on genetic testing. He presented arguments as to why he
believed that “exclusive licensing of genetic associations” should be barred. 86 Grodman
presented two points of focus. First, Grodman argued that exclusive licensing runs
contrary to public health. Second, he proposed a remedy to the problem, which lies
within the Bayh-Dole Act. 87
Grodman posited that competition in genetic testing is critical to public health. He
succinctly stated, “In the area of genetic testing, exclusivity is a formula for
mediocrity.” 88 In one illustration, Grodman discussed the highly publicized Myriad case,
which, like the Canavan case mentioned earlier, has become an often-cited case for
patent reform. 89 A genetic test for hereditary breast and ovarian cancer, based on full
DNA sequencing of BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes to identify mutations, was developed by
Myriad using an exclusive license from the University of Utah, which holds the patents
on these genes. 90 Grodman argued that these tests were not as comprehensive as they
could have been if other researchers were permitted to create a better test. Further, the
test is expensive, in the range of $3,000, reducing the number of people who can afford
the test. 91 To reinforce that the problem is not isolated to breast cancer, Grodman
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submitted an appendix listing problems encountered due to exclusive licensing in the area
of neurological disorders. 92
The Myriad gene patent controversy undoubtedly provides a cautionary example of
the negative potential of gene patents. An analysis of the policy reports published after
2002 shows that the Myriad story was, by far, the most referenced gene patent
controversy. 93 The Myriad story was often used as a specific justification for patent
reform. 94 However, many policy reports and suggested reforms receive very little media
attention, and one study provides data suggesting that the media coverage was
responsible for driving a political agenda. 95
Grodman’s solution to the exclusive licensing problem falls well short of the scope
of the GRAA. His proposal is to exercise the “march-in” powers of the Bayh-Dole Act, 96
which empowers the federal agency funding the research (usually the National Institute
of Health in most academic research settings) and provides licenses to other interested
parties when the “health or safety needs” of the American people are not being
“reasonably satisfied” by the patent holder or its exclusive licensee. 97 Lawrence Sung
also echoed Grodman’s calling for exercise of Bayh-Dole march-in rights. 98
Interestingly, the NIH has never exercised its “march-in” powers, and has denied
formal requests to march in. 99 However, in these cases, the denials involved
pharmaceuticals rather than genetic testing. 100 Grodman contrasted genetic testing and
pharmaceuticals, pointing out convincingly that several drugs can effectively treat a
disease, but most diseases only deal with one or a handful of genes. The licenses would
still be profitable by establishing a reasonable royalty. 101 Grodman hedged his proposal:
“I am not asking for a free ride; all I am asking for is the ability to compete fairly and
benefit the public and my company.” 102
One 2006 study suggests that the prevalence of exclusive licensing seems to be
overstated. 103 The survey of technology transfer of DNA inventions reveals that
universities actively promote licensing patent rights to biotechnology companies, but
rarely grant exclusive licenses. 104 Further, the report finds that the exclusive licenses
granted are limited in nature, most frequently by “field of use” restrictions. 105
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If gene patents can be read to cover genetic testing, then granting exclusive rights
to genetic testing could be found to hurt public health. Dr. Roger D. Klein, a medical
doctor, attorney, and genetic testing advocate, admits that “given that almost all disease
has a genetic component, this state of affairs bodes poorly for the future of healthcare
generally.” 106 However, Klein goes on to suggest that the legal threats on genetic testing
may lack substance. Current United States law does not permit patents on human genes
or patents on correlations between genetic variants, which dates back to the prohibition of
patenting of natural phenomena. 107 The Supreme Court, most recently in Diamond v.
Diehr, has repeatedly affirmed the natural phenomenon doctrine. 108
¶55
Recently, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to rule on a case with direct
implications for the validity or enforceability of gene-related patents that have restricted
the development and implementation of genetic testing. In October 2005, the Court
granted certiorari in Laboratory Corporation of America v. Metabolite Laboratories,
Inc. 109 The claim at issue was a method for detecting a cobalamin or folate deficiency in
animals by testing a body fluid for an elevated level of total homocysteine. Review was
granted only with respect to whether a method correlating results can validly claim a
scientific relationship used in medical treatment such that, after looking at a test result, a
doctor infringes the patent merely by thinking about the relationship. Regrettably, after
oral argument, the Supreme Court dismissed the case. Three justices, led by Justice
Breyer, would have heard the case and would have found the patent invalid. Justice
Scalia commented, “[B]ut here what [claim] 13 involves is simply discovery of the
natural principle that when . . . there is the presence of one substance in a human being,
there is a deficiency of two other ones. That’s just a natural principle.” 110
¶56
The natural principle doctrine prevents patenting of biological relationships
between genetic changes and physical characteristics that are at the heart of genetic
testing. 111 According to Klein, so long as the courts do not expand the scope of generelated patents to include genetic testing, there is likely no legal risk to pursue these
diagnostics.
¶57
Becerra’s argument that exclusive licensing has a negative impact on genetic
testing may have some merit. However, it is questionable whether gene patents are the
source of these problems. The GRAA is likely an overbroad response to this problem,
and most commentators, including Grodman, argue that less invasive legislation is more
appropriate.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
¶58

The GRAA faces an uphill battle. Read literally, the language of the bill is far too
broad. In essence, the bill would ban patenting on all naturally-occurring proteins
106
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produced by any biological means. It would also ban any diagnostic tool that relied on
the identification of mutations in the genetic code. This would include a ban on patenting
all natural, therapeutic proteins and any diagnostic assay that depended on detection of
genetic polymorphisms. The bill would eliminate patent production for the molecules
that are expected to provide new drugs, crippling the biotechnology industry in the
process. The GRAA does reference the important need for careful regulation regarding
overbroad DNA patents, though a more detailed and less reactive legislation should be
explored.
¶59
Becerra simply does not know enough about the problem, as illustrated by the
unreasonably broad sweep of the GRAA. The proposals by the witnesses at the hearing
reflect the concern that enacting revolutionary legislation is unwise. According to
Grodman and Sung, the solution may be available though currently available legislative
means. Indeed, all of the testimony heard at the October 2007 hearing warned of the
delicate nature of this type of legislation and that much more research and deliberation is
needed before this Act or any other is passed.
¶60
The evolution of the stricter patentability standard, coupled with the available
statutory regulation, is enough to handle the problems that the GRAA is proposed to
solve. While we should applaud Becerra’s recognition of need for reform, the indirect
and debilitating effects of the GRAA will vastly outweigh the potential resolution of the
issues Becerra presents. Congress must prioritize analysis of scientific data before voting
on such legislation, rather than responding to inflammatory editorials from newspapers
and isolated, media-friendly case studies.
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